That starts with tenders. Tenders now are often vaguely formulated, inadequately publicized, or not embedded in a clear and accessible military development strategy. Large technology and defense companies can play a key role in large-scale NATO projects, but lack predictable frameworks in which they can contribute effectively. Conversely, we cannot expect an armed force to incorporate in-depth knowledge of new breakthrough technologies into plans.
The Netherlands is not the only country that will invest substantially more in defense. Only a few countries meet the new NATO norm that requires 3.5% to 5% of GNP to be spent on defense. A single country like Poland meets that standard, most other countries do not. If we continue to set up our industry as we are used to, American industry in particular will benefit. After all, about 75% of current defense spending goes to American companies. For European and Dutch companies to benefit from the higher NATO standard, we have to make choices quickly.
If we really want to accelerate, industry and government must dare to make joint strategic choices: where does the Netherlands want to be a leader? What do we build ourselves, and where do we seek reinforcement within NATO? And where do Dutch companies take the lead to set the new standards in NATO context, instead of the current European fragmented standards?
The current system is also unclear for medium-sized companies and specialized suppliers. They lack access to operational information, making it difficult to properly align their offerings with what is actually needed. On the other hand, the armed forces do not gain enough knowledge of emerging technology and dual-use solutions to meet their operational goals. More structural cooperation with military units - through exercises, joint development paths and experimental environments - is needed to build that bridge.
At the same time, we must remain realistic. The defense sector is different from other markets. Reliability, interoperability, security and long-term deployability are prerequisites, and a sustainable relationship with industry sometimes plays a bigger role in this than having the latest technology. Start-ups and scale-ups often do not (yet) have access to these. Without guidance, test centers and appropriate funding, their potential remains untapped. While they can be enormously relevant to themes such as hybrid warfare, information infrastructure and AI, and can also help shape market demand from the armed forces.
Those same themes - AI, cyber, information superiority - deserve more strategic focus anyway. NATO has defined a set of technology areas that will have a major impact on the military conflict of the future. These "Emerging Disruptive Technologies" underscore that modern warfare has long since moved beyond the battlefield. Companies that can provide solutions for such things as data integration, situational awareness and smart decision-making are indispensable. But then their technology must be able to be embedded in military doctrine as well as procurement systems that understand these dynamics.
The next few years will be decisive. Those who do not build a smart, capable and strategic industry now will remain dependent. On the other hand, defense policy without clear choices is no policy. It is time for direction, cooperation and quality, to win together.
Stefan de Bruijn and Lennart Salemink